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Abstract 
 
Between 1993 and April 1999 there was no minimum wage in the UK (except in agriculture).  
In this paper we study the effects of the introduction of a National Minimum Wage (NMW) 
in April 1999 on one heavily affected sector, the residential care homes industry.  This sector 
contains a large number of low paid workers and as such is a sector one can view as being 
very vulnerable to minimum wage legislation.  We look at the impact on both wages and 
employment.  Our results suggest that the minimum wage raised the wages of a large number 
of care homes workers, causing a very big wage compression of the lower end of the wage 
distribution, thereby strongly reducing wage inequality.  There is some evidence of 
employment and hours reductions after the minimum wage introduction, but there appears to 
be no effect on home closure. 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Labour Markets Programme 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We are very grateful to the numerous students who punched the care homes data in to the 
computer, together with Thomas Metcalf and Danny Goldup who helped with the 
questionnaires.  We would also like to thank Daron Acemoglu, Josh Angrist, Paul Gregg, 
Dan Hamermesh, Jim Heckman, Steve Levitt, David Metcalf, Nicole Fortin, John Pencavel 
and participants in seminars or conferences at Chicago, the IMF, MIT, the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, the SoLE meetings in Baltimore, STICERD (LSE), Southampton, Warwick and 
Yale for a number of comments and suggestions.  Some of the work on this paper was done  
during the first author’s leave during the 2001/2 academic year in the Economics Department 
at MIT, whose hospitality and support are gratefully acknowledged. 
Stephen Machin is a member of the Department of Economics, University College 
London and Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics.  Alan 
Manning is a member of the Department of Economics and Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics.  Lupin Rahman is a member of STICERD, 
London School of Economics. 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London  WC2A 2AE 
 
Ó S. Machin, A. Manning and L. Rahman, submitted May 2002 
 
ISBN 0 7530 1565 X 
 
Individual copy price:  £5 
   
Where the Minimum Wage Bites Hard:   
the Introduction of the UK National Minimum  
Wage to a Low Wage Sector  
 
Stephen Machin, Alan Manning and Lupin Rahman 
 
 
September 2002 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  1 
 
2. Minimum Wages in the UK and the Care Homes Sector 3 
 
3. Data Issues and Descriptive Statistics 5 
 
4. Wages and the Minimum Wage 8 
 
5. Employment and the Minimum Wage  13 
 
6. Conclusions   18 
 
Tables    20 
 
Figures   29 
 
Appendix:  Pre Introduction Survey 33 
 
Appendix:  Post Introduction Survey 36 
 
References   39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council 
 1
1.  Introduction 
 
The debate on the economic effects of minimum wages remains a controversial and heavily 
researched question.  In fact there currently appears to be something of a methodological 
divide amongst economists about what minimum wages actually do to economic outcomes.  
Some researchers choose to stick to what used to be the orthodoxy, at least since Brown, 
Gilroy and Kohen’s (1982) influential survey of the evidence available up to the late 1970s, 
that minimum wages are bad for employment, especially teenage employment.  Others have 
been more swayed by the recent ‘before and after’ micro work (Card, 1992; Card and 
Krueger, 1994, 1995) which finds it hard to identify any employment effect at all and moves 
the question on from ‘how negative is the minimum wage employment effect?’ to ‘is there 
any impact on employment at all?’  The vast majority of work used to inform this debate is 
based upon US data (Brown, 1999).  Some fresh evidence, from a different context, probably 
needs to be cast on these questions.1  We attempt to offer some evidence of this sort in this 
paper, where we have a unique design setting induced by the introduction of a minimum 
wage to a labour market previously unregulated by minimum wage legislation. 
In April 1999 a National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced to the UK labour 
market.  This is the first time that the UK has had an economy wide minimum wage.  
Furthermore, because the old industry-based Wages Council system that used to regulate pay 
in some sectors was abolished in 1993, the NMW was introduced into a labour market with 
no minimum wage legislation in operation. 2  Given these circumstances one can think of the 
introduction of the UK NMW as providing a very good testing ground for evaluating the 
economic effects of minimum wages.  In fact one can plausibly argue that it provides a better 
testing ground than much of the ‘before and after’ US work on minimum wage effects (see 
the discussion in Card and Krueger, 1995) as they are all based upon minimum wage 
increases where a minimum wage floor was already in place.   
In this paper we look at what happened when the UK minimum wage was introduced 
in a low wage sector one can view as being particularly vulnerable to minimum wages, the 
UK residential care homes industry.  Our analysis is based upon a large-scale survey that we 
carried out before and after the introduction of the NMW.  The survey focused upon the 
                                                                 
1  Indeed, one of Hamermesh’s (2002) prime examples of where international empirical work in labour 
economics is required to inform the US debate is in the area of minimum wage effects. 
2  Except in agriculture.  The Agricultural Wages Board was not abolished along with the other Wages Councils. 
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whole population of residential care homes in Britain, collecting information on all workers 
in the homes, and on an array of home characteristics.   
We chose to look at this sector for several reasons.  First, it contains many low-wage 
workers, so the minimum wage has real potential to have a noticeable important impact on 
outcomes.3  Second, we chose this sector because it is not unionised.  Thirdly, it consists of 
large numbers of small firms (average employment being somewhere in the range of 15-20 
workers) doing a very homogeneous activity in geographically concentrated markets.  The 
small size of these firms means that monitoring problems are unlikely to be severe because 
the owner normally also works in the home and also that collection of good quality data on 
all workers is feasible.  Finally, the product market side of this sector is interesting.  An 
important fraction of the residents of these homes have their care paid for by the Department 
for Social Security (DSS).  But, the amount they pay is capped and was not increased when 
the minimum was introduced.  Homes whose residents are paid for by the DSS are then in a 
situation where they are not able to pass any of their cost increases on to prices:  this is likely 
to increase the scope for identifying employment effects from minimum wage introduction.   
There is, of course, one disadvantage to looking at a sector in which minimum wages 
really ‘bite’, namely that one is more likely to find negative effects of minimum wages on 
employment.  While labour economists have debated the relative merits of perfect 
competition or monopsony as models to explain the negative, positive or non-existent effects 
of minimum wages on employment (see, for example, Brown, 1999 for a recent review of 
this) all models of the labour market predict that a high enough minimum wage will reduce 
employment.  So, one must be careful not to extrapolate from studies of one sector 
(especially the kind of sector we study) to conclusions about the economy as a whole. 
 We consider what happened to wages and employment in the care homes sector in the 
period surrounding the introduction of the NMW.  The analysis confirms that the choice of 
sector is a good one for studying the likely impact of minimum wages.  Pay is very low, with 
the average hourly wage being around £4 just before the minimum wage introduction.  
Before its introduction around 1 in 3 workers were paid less than the minimum wage.  In 
April 1999 we see a spike in the wage distribution of around 30 percent at the minimum 
wage.  The minimum wage clearly ‘bit hard’ in this sector.  It therefore provides a very good 
environment for looking at the impact of the minimum wage on employment. 
                                                                 
3  This logic is, of course, similar in spirit to Castillo-Freeman and Freeman’s (1991) study of Puerto Rico.  
Focusing on situations where more low paid workers are present obviously heightens the chance of finding 
employment effects of minimum wages. 
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 We look at the employment effects of the minimum wage by considering what is now 
a standard technique in the empirical literature on minimum wages and employment.  We 
relate changes in employment before and after the minimum wage introduction to the fraction 
of low paid workers in the pre-minimum wage period (see, for example, Card’s 1992 state 
based study of an increase in the US federal minimum wage in the early 1990s).  In summary 
we find a sizable wage impact, together with employment and hours reductions following the 
introduction of the minimum wage, but there appears to be no effect on home closure.   
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents a brief history of 
minimum wage legislation in the UK and some summary statistics on employment over time 
in the sector upon which we focus.  Section 3 describes our data collection process and 
presents some descriptive statistics.  Section 4 reports on our empirical findings on the wage 
effects of the minimum wage.  Section 5 then moves on to consider the employment and 
hours effects, together with a brief investigation of other possible outcomes.  Section 6 then 
concludes. 
 
 
2.  Minimum Wages in the UK and the Care Homes Sector 
 
Minimum Wages in the UK 
 
Unlike many other countries, minimum wages have historically not had a very important role 
to play in the UK labour market.  This is certainly true at the national level where there has 
never been an economy wide minimum wage floor.  But minimum wages used to be a factor 
in some low wage sectors.  There used to be an industry-based system of minimum wage 
floors, the Wages Councils, which operated from 1909 to their abolition in 1993.  These 
Wages Councils covered around 12 percent of the workforce at the time of their abolition.  In 
some earlier work we have studied the impact of the Wages Councils, concluding that their 
activities did little to harm employment, but that they compressed the wage structures of the 
sectors in which they operated  (Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999; Dolado et al, 1996). 
 Following its election in 1997, Tony Blair’s Labour Government was committed to 
introducing a National Minimum Wage (as the Labour Party had been in earlier elections that 
they lost).  It set up a Low Pay Commission consisting of academics and representatives of 
employers and workers to report on a suitable form and level (see Low Pay Commission, 
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1998).  Eventually, a minimum wage of £3.60 per hour was introduced in April 1999 for 
those aged 22 or older, with a lower youth rate of £3 per hour for those aged 18-21 inclusive 
(those aged less than 18 were not covered).  The Low Pay Commission expected that around 
9 percent of workers would be directly affected and those workers would, on average, receive 
a 30 percent boost to their pay (Metcalf, 1999).  These numbers have subsequently been 
revised down, with it seeming more likely that about 6 percent of workers’ wages were raised 
up to the minimum (Dickens and Manning, 2001).  This, of course, still amounts to a 
potentially large impact on the labour market. 
Moreover, it is also clear that there is systematic variation in who benefited from 
minimum wage introduction.  Metcalf (1999) also notes the increased importance of the 
minimum wage for part-time female workers.  Of the workers he estimates to be directly 
affected by the introduction of the minimum wage around 55 percent were women working 
part-time.  The sector upon which we focus, the care homes sector, and particularly its 
principal occupation, that of care assistant, is very female intensive and has many part-time 
workers.  Furthermore, as we will see when we describe our data more fully below, the 
majority of workers in this sector possess few formal qualifications and wages are very low.  
As such this is very much a sector that had the potential to be hit hard by the minimum wage. 
 
The Labour Market for Care Assistants 
 
The occupation of care assistant is not only one of the lowest paid occupations 4 but also is an 
increasingly important one in the UK.  Indeed, not surprisingly given the aging of the 
population, the employment of care assistants has risen in recent years in the UK.  One can 
gain some idea about the aggregate picture from looking at the number of care assistants in 
the quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS).  Figure 1 shows total employment of care 
assistants in the private sector between 1994 and 2001.5  The vertical line on the Figure refers 
to the date of minimum wage introduction. 
 The Figure shows a rise in the number of private sector care assistants from around 
220000 in 1994 to 330000 by 2001.  But closer scrutiny of the Figure shows that, according 
to these aggregate numbers, there appears to be a moderate slowing down of employment 
growth in the later time period after minimum wage introduction.  Of course, this can only be 
                                                                 
4  Taking a look at the occupational breakdowns in the published New Earnings Survey Tables each year 
normally finds the lowest paid occupation in the UK to be either hairdressers or care assistants. 
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suggestive as business cycle factors may be at play here.  However, looking at the temporal 
pattern of residuals from a regression of care assistant employment on the aggregate 
unemployment rate (or on GDP) still reveals the slower increases occurring post-minimum 
wage introduction (especially into the year 2000)6. 
 This is illustrative of general employment trends for care assistants.  However, to 
properly consider the question of employment effects of minimum wage introduction in a 
more systematic and rigorous fashion one really requires micro-data on a big enough sample 
of care assistants before and after minimum wage introduction.  This is therefore what we 
turn to next. 
 
 
3.  Data Issues and Descriptive Statistics    
 
Most existing UK data sources are really not well suited to carrying out a detailed before and 
after evaluation of the economic impact of the introduction of the UK minimum wage.7 We 
therefore decided to collect our own data.  We wanted to focus on a situation where the 
minimum wage had the potential to have an important impact and so chose to collect data on 
employers and workers in residential care homes. 
 As already noted, there are several compelling reasons for choosing this sector.  First, 
it is a leading employer of many low wage workers.  As already noted, the principal 
occupation, care assistants, is one of the lowest paid occupations in the UK.  Second, most 
homes are reasonably small (average employment size < 20; median employment size = 15) 
and this enables us to collect data on all workers within the homes.  Third, there are basically 
no trade unions to distort wage-setting procedures in this sector.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
5  Each point on Figure corresponds to the mid -month of each LFS quarter (which respectively cover the months 
March-May, June-August, September-November, December-February). 
6  Separate regressions of the log of the number care assistants on log(unemployment rate) and log(gdp) 
produced coefficients (standard errors) of -.68 (.04) and 1.18 (.07).  Both regressions had an R-squared of .91. 
7  For example the survey containing the best wage data, and which covers the largest sample of workers, is the 
New Earnings Survey (NES).  This has several serious shortcomings if one wished to try and evaluate the 
impact of minimum wage introduction.  First, it is carried out in April of each year which is unfortunate as the 
minimum wage was introduced in April 1999.  Wages contained in the survey are therefore a mish mash of pre- 
and post-introduction wages.  Second, and even more important, it undersamples low wage part-time workers 
(as workers below the National Insurance weekly earnings lower limit are not well picked up).  The other 
commonly used micro-data suffer from other problems.  First most (like the General Household Survey or the 
Family Expenditure Survey) simply do not contain enough low wage workers.  Second as they are employee, 
rather than employer, surveys they are likely to be characterised by measurement errors in wages (see Dickens 
and Manning’s, 2001, analysis of Labour Force Survey data).   
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Sample Design  
 
Our sample design was to sample the population of UK care homes before and after the 
introduction of the minimum wage.  We obtained lists of all homes from the Yellow Pages 
Business Database in July 1998 (for the pre-minimum sampling) and in May 1999 (for the 
post-minimum sampling).  There were 11635 care homes in the former and 11036 homes in 
the latter.  As one of the things one might be interested in is the extent to which employers 
adjusted wages before the minimum wage introduction we sampled (based on area 
stratification) one-ninth of the homes in each of the nine months before minimum wage 
introduction, and then we re-sampled the homes (including new homes), again one-ninth at a 
time, in the nine months following the introduction of the wage floor.  We also identified 
home closures that occurred over this time period. 
 The questionnaire was mailed to the manager of the care homes and asked a range of 
questions about the home and about the views managers (who are often home owners) had 
about the minimum wage.  For obvious reasons, the precise nature of the attitudinal questions 
was different for questionnaires sent out before and after the introduction of the minimum 
wage.  Managers were also asked to provide data on job title, sex, age, length of service, 
possession of a nursing qualification, weekly hours and hourly wages for all workers.  The 
exact questionnaires are reproduced in the Appendix to the paper.   
For a postal survey we achieved a reasonable response rate (of the order of around 20 
percent) and, in terms of number of residents, area and employment size of homes, the 
responses were representative of the population as a whole.  In a small number of homes 
managers were less likely to complete all the information on worker characteristics.  In these 
cases where there was missing information on hourly wages and/or hours we imputed them 
using the average for that job within that firm.  We report both results including and 
excluding imputed figures below. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Some features of the sample are described in Table 1.  The first two columns show the 
characteristics of the total sample of workers and homes pre and post minimum wage 
introduction, the middle two for all homes that we obtained some responses on worker 
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characteristics in both sampling periods (the balanced panel of homes) and the final two 
columns further exclude homes where worker information supplied was very patchy. 8   
 The Table reveals a number of pertinent features of the labour market under study.  
First, and probably most striking, wages really are very low in the care homes sector.  Before 
the introduction of the minimum wage average wages were about £4 per hour (whether or not 
we include imputed wages does not make much difference).  This sector therefore clearly 
satisfies one of the criteria we wanted to emphasise in a study of the impact of minimum 
wage introduction, namely that the imposition of the minimum wage floor had the potential 
to affect a large number of workers.   
The second clear feature of the wages data is that they rose sharply after minimum 
wage introduction.  Average wages went up by somewhere around 24 pence per hour (or by 
around 6 percent).  We consider this in much more detail in the next Section where we 
discuss the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage introduction.  Of course, the requirement that the 
minimum wage introduction significantly affected wages and their distribution is a pre-
requisite for going on to look at employment effects. 
 The Table also documents other characteristics of the sample.  Average home size is 
fairly small, both in terms of workers and residents.  Mean employment is in the range of 16 
to 17 workers, and the average number of residents is around 17 to 18 per home.  They both 
remain fairly constant before and after the minimum wage introduction. 
 As stated earlier the principal occupation in this sector is care assistants.  This 
occupational group comprises over 60 percent of the workers in the sample.  The workers are 
typically older workers (average age about 40), overwhelmingly female, working an average 
of 25 hours per week.  Only around 1 in 10 possess a nursing qualification (other educational 
qualifications are not relevant in this sector).   
 Finally, we have collected other home level information on the occupancy rate of beds 
and, since the sector has price regulation operating through local authorities, on the percent of 
residents who pay local authority prices for beds.  This latter feature of the sector is, of 
course, very interesting in the context of minimum wage effects.  One argument sometimes 
put forward in the literature is that one may not observe employment responses to minimum 
wages if employers are able to pass minimum wage increases on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices.  This seems unlikely to happen in the care homes sector as prices are, in many 
cases, regulated by local authorities.  In this regard, it is useful to note that prices do not seem 
                                                                 
8  More specifically we exclude homes where less than half of the workers have missing hours or wage 
information. 
 8
to go up by much after the minimum wage introduction.  We return to possible price 
responses later, after considering the wage and employment effects of the minimum wage 
introduction. 
 
 
4.  Wages and the Minimum Wage 
 
Before considering the employment consequences of minimum wage introduction, one 
clearly needs to establish that the minimum wage had the effect one expects on wages and the 
distribution of wages.  As noted above, confirming that the minimum wage introduction had 
real ‘bite’ and affected the wages of low wage workers in the expected direction is clearly a 
prerequisite before one goes on to look at the impact on employment. 
 
The ‘Bite’ of The Minimum Wage Introduction  
 
The UK National Minimum Wage was introduced in April 1999 at £3.60 per hour for 
workers aged 22 or more, and at £3.00 per hour for 18-21 year olds.  When presenting 
measures of the impact of the minimum wage we sometimes use these age-specific minimum 
wages and sometimes just the adult minimum:  the reason for this is that there is a spike in 
the youth wage distribution at the adult minimum after the introduction so that one could 
argue that the adult minimum is the effective minimum (see Katz and Krueger, 1992, for 
evidence that in the US the youth sub-minimum is rarely used).   
 Table 2 reports on our investigations of the impact of minimum wage introduction on 
wages.  The numbers in the Table demonstrate a clear importance of minimum wage 
introduction for care home workers.  The Table shows the percentage of workers paid less 
than the minimum wage prior to its introduction, how far wages would have to be increased if 
these workers’ wages were raised to the minimum and the percentage paid at exactly the 
minimum (the size of the minimum wage spike in the wage distribution).  As with Table 1 
statistics are reported for all care homes, for the balanced panel and then for the balanced 
panel that excludes homes with limited worker information. 
The first thing to notice in the Table is that the sector we are studying is one that, 
conditional on the minimum wage introduction being binding, had the potential to be very 
heavily affected by the national minimum wage.  Around 32 percent of workers were paid 
 9
below the (age-specific) minimum wage before it was introduced.  Around 38 percent were 
paid below the adult minimum rate. 
Table 2 also presents measures of the ‘wage gap’, namely the average increase in 
wages needed to bring workers beneath the mandated minimum up to the minimum.  The 
wage gap in firm i is computed as 
å
å -
=
j
jiji
j
ji
min
jiji
i Wh
)0,Wmax(Wh
GAP where hji is the weekly 
hours worked by worker j in firm i, Wji is the hourly wage of worker j in firm i, and Wjimin is 
the minimum wage relevant for worker j in firm i (this might be the age-specific or the adult 
minimum).  Table 2 shows that the wage gap averages 4 percent using the age-specific 
minimum and 4.7 percent using the adult minimum.  Again this confirms a potentially very 
large impact of the minimum wage introduction on the sector. 
That the minimum wage impacted hard on the wage structure of care homes is borne 
out by looking at the post-minimum columns of the Table.  First, there seems to be very little 
under-payment (around 1 percent for all homes or slightly lower in the balanced panels).  
However, something one might be concerned about here is that firms that subsequently pay 
illegally below the minimum wage do not respond to our survey.  But if this was true we 
would expect to see the initial wage levels in our sample as a whole being below those in our 
balanced panel as the latter group also respond after the minimum wage is increased:  in 
Table 1 one can see that there is no evidence that this is the case.9  
The second feature of Table 2 that shows the minimum wage ‘bit’ hard is the very 
noticeable spike at the minimum after April 1999.  Something like 28 or 29 percent of 
workers were paid the age-specific minimum after introduction and around 30 to 31 percent 
were paid the adult minimum.  One should notice here that the spike is measured at exactly 
the minimum wage (not as plus or minus a small range around the minimum as in some other 
studies). 
Not surprisingly the minimum wage introduction therefore had a sizable impact on 
wage dispersion.  The gap between the 50th and 10th percentiles of the log (hourly wage) 
distribution narrowed from .21 to .09.  At the same time the upper half of the distribution was 
unaffected with the gap between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the distribution not changing.  
The 90-50 gap was .34 in both pre- and post-minimum time periods.10   
                                                                 
9  We also investigated whether the sample response rates fell disproportionately in the low-wage regions where 
the minimum wage had more bite.  There was no evidence this was the case. 
10  See Dickens and Manning (2001) for an in-depth analysis of the impact of minimum wage introduction on 
wage inequality in the UK. 
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Minimum Wage Introduction and Care Home Wages 
 
The numbers in Table 2 show a strong impact of minimum wage introduction on the care 
homes wage distribution.  But, for our empirical analysis, we would also like evidence that 
the homes we would most expect to be affected were, indeed, the most affected.  This is the 
purpose of this sub-section.  More specifically the basic wage change equations we estimate 
are of the form: 
 
DlnWit  = a1+ b1MINi,t -1 + d1Xi,t -1 + e it    (1) 
 
where DlnWit is the change in wages for home i in the period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction (t-1 denotes the period before, t the post-minimum period), MINi, t -1 is a measure 
of the importance of the minimum wage for home i (defined below), Xi,t -1 is the (t-1) level 
home and worker characteristics11 and e it is an error term.  The key parameter of interest is b1 
which measures the relation between wage changes and the minimum holding constant the 
other factors we control for. 
 There are some practical concerns with this kind of equation.  The first issue is how 
one measures MINi, t -1.  We use the two measures of the impact of the minimum wage already 
discussed in Table 2:  the proportion of workers paid less than the minimum wage in the 
period before its introduction, and the wage gap.  It is not clear which is the better measure.  
For example, if the minimum wage caused all workers initially paid below it to lose their 
jobs, then the headcount might be the better measure, but if it is more difficult to raise the 
productivity of those a long way below the minimum wage than those near it, then the wage 
gap measure might be better. 
 The second main modeling issue concerns identification.  Because the minimum wage 
introduction in the UK was at national level the variation across homes in the impact of the 
minimum wage all comes from variation in the initial level of wages.  b1 is then only a true 
measure of the impact of the minimum wage if, in the absence of the minimum wage, there 
would be no relationship between the initial level of wages and the change in wages (i.e.  if 
wages follow a random walk).  This is the implicit identification assumption in using an 
equation like (1) to estimate the impact of the minimum wage.   
                                                                 
11  We also considered models where the change in X, DXit, was entered.  This made very little difference 
throughout our analysis. 
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We test this identifying assumption in two related ways that consider whether the 
relationship between wage changes and their initial level shifted in the period surrounding 
minimum wage introduction relative to an earlier period when no minimum wage was in 
place.  We first look at the relationship between wage changes and initial wages in the 
minimum wage introduction period (1998/99) as compared to the relationship estimated from 
some data we collected in an earlier time period (1992/93) for care homes on the south coast 
of England.12  Second we consider whether the relationship between wage changes and the 
minimum wage variable altered across these two time periods by constructing a counter-
factual minimum wage variable (placing the minimum at the same percentile point of the 
initial wage distribution13) in the earlier non-minimum wage time period.  We do this for both 
the headcount and wage gap measures.  The two approaches thereby enable us to cons ider 
whether one observes a different association in the period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction as compared to an earlier time period where no such policy was in place. 
 
Estimates of Wage Change Equations  
 
Table 3 reports estimates of home-level wage change equations for hourly wages (upper 
panel) and for weekly wages (lower panel) in the period surrounding minimum wage 
introduction.  Four specifications are reported in each case.  Rows (1) and (2) present 
estimates of wage equations including the initial low pay proportion to measure MINi, t-1.  
They differ in that the first specification excludes and the second specification includes a set 
of control variables.  Rows (3) and (4) then present analogous specifications using the wage 
gap measure as an independent variable.   
In all cases there is evidence of bigger wage increases in homes with more low-wage 
workers in the pre-minimum wage period.  The associations are strong in statistical terms and 
are sizable.  They also look rather similar for hourly and weekly wages.  For example, 
according to row (2) of the upper panel of Table 3 a home with one third of its workers paid 
less than the minimum saw average wage growth of 3.3 percent higher than one which had 
                                                                 
12  See Machin, Manning and Woodland (1993) for more detail on this earlier survey.  This 1992/93 survey was 
carried out for the same reason as the current one, namely to evaluate the impact of minimum wage introduction 
on care homes.  The first wave of the survey was carried out before the April 1992 election as the Labour Party 
manifesto had committed to introduce a minimum wage if they were elected.  Their loss of the election meant 
our plan to carry out a before and after analysis of minimum wage introduction was scuppered.  We still, 
however, collected data after the election period and so can look at before and after changes with these data as 
well. 
13  This corresponds to £2.75 per hour. 
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one tenth of its workers paid less than the minimum.14  This is large given that average wage 
growth was around 6 percent in this time period. 
 These results appear to establish an important impact on wages of the minimum wage 
but, as noted above, it may merely be because there has always been a link between wage 
growth and initial low pay.  So we investigate this in some detail in Table 4.  We do so in the 
two main ways already mentioned above.  First, we estimate equations relating wage change 
to the initial period average wage in the periods surrounding minimum wage introduction and 
in the earlier 1992/93 time period for which we have data where no minimum wage was in 
place.  This equation takes the form: 
 
 DlnWit  = a2 + ß2lnWi,t -1 + uit     (2) 
 
where the focus is now on estimating the association between wage changes and the initial 
average wage, namely the parameter ß2  (u is an error term). 
 The second way in which we benchmark our results against the earlier time period is 
to return to equation (1) and specify a counter-factual minimum wage in the earlier non-
minimum wage period so as to compute measures of the initial low pay proportion and wage 
gap variables.  We do so by placing this counter- factual minimum at the same percentile 
point of the wage distribution. 
 Table 4 reports these results for hourly wages.  For all three specifications there is a 
clear shift in the relationship between wage changes and the initial wage measures in the 
period surrounding minimum wage introduction as compared to the earlier time period.  The 
significantly negative coefficient on the initial wage in the 1998/99 model in row (1) of the 
Table demonstrates very clearly that, in the period surrounding minimum wage introduction, 
wage growth was higher in firms with lower wages in the initial period.  In the earlier non-
minimum wage period (1992/93) there is also a negative coefficient on the initial wage, but it 
is clear that its magnitude is much smaller (in absolute terms) than in 1998/99.  The final 
column reports the gap between the two and it is very clear that the relationship shifted 
markedly between the two time periods. 
 Some graphs also serve to make the same point.  Figure 2a plots the relationship 
between average wage growth and the initial log wage in 1998/99 and Figure 2b does the 
same for the 1992/93 data.  While it is very clear that there is a negative relationship in both 
                                                                 
14  The calculation is .145*(.33 - .10) = .033. 
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periods, the strong diagonal effect on homes with initial low wages is very apparent in the 
1998/99 data.  This reveals a clear impact of the minimum wage. 
 In rows (2) and (3) of Table 4 we also report results of wage growth equations 
including the initial minimum wage variables for the 1998/99 data and the counter- factual 
initial minimum wage variables for the 1992/93 data.  These very much reconfirm the pattern 
from the row (1) models.  There is a marked shift between periods for both measures as one 
can see a much stronger positive impact of the initial minimum wage variables in the period 
surrounding minimum wage introduction.  Indeed, there is no relationship between wage 
changes and the initial low pay proportion in the earlier non-minimum wage period and a 
much smaller association with the initial wage gap measure.  This shift is borne out by the 
positive, statistically significant gaps given in the final column of the Table. 
All in all, the evidence of this Section has established a clear and important effect of 
minimum wage introduction on care home wages.  We turn to investigate the possible 
employment effects in the next section. 
 
 
5.  Employment and the Minimum Wage 
 
We analyse the employment consequences of the minimum wage introduction using the same 
kind of methodology as the wage analysis.  We estimate home-level equations that relate 
changes in employment or hours in the period surrounding minimum wage introduction to 
headcount and wage measures of the extent of initial low pay.  And, because of the 
identification questions already raised, we look at the relationship between changes in 
employment and initial wage levels in the period of minimum wage introduction and the 
period where no minimum wage was in place.  We begin with the latter in the next sub-
section, and then move on to the former after that. 
 
Changes in Employment and Initial Wages 
 
As before, the implicit identification assumption here is that, in the absence of the minimum 
wage, there would be no relationship between employment growth and the initial level of 
wages.  It is not obvious this is the case (e.g.  homes that are doing less well might pay lower 
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wages and have lower employment growth) so we start by investigating the relationship 
between employment growth and initial wages. 
Table 5 reports the results of carrying out this exercise for the period surrounding 
minimum wage introduction (1998/99) and for the earlier period (1992/93) where no such 
policy intervention occurred.  The upper panel of the Table reports models where changes in 
log total employment are related to the initial period wage measures, whilst the lower panel 
reports results where the dependent variable is the change in log total hours. 
 The first thing to note is that the correlations of employment changes with initial wage 
measures tend to be weaker than the correlations with wage changes considered earlier.  That 
said, there is some evidence (of varying strength depending on specification) of shifts 
occurring between the ‘policy on’ and ‘policy off’ time periods.  In all cases but one, the sign 
of the relationship switches between periods, revealing a tilt in the relationship so that, in the 
period surrounding minimum wage introduction, employment growth tended to be reduced in 
homes that were impacted more by minimum wage introduction.  And some of the gaps in 
the final column are statistically significant (or on the borders of significance, the one 
exception being the initial period low proportion in the upper panel of the Table).  We take 
this as some preliminary evidence that the relationship between employment and low wages 
may have shifted in the period surrounding minimum wages. 
 
Changes in Employment and Initial Minimum Wage Variables 
 
In this sub-section we consider in more detail the relationship between home-level 
employment and hours changes and the minimum wage variables in the period surrounding 
minimum wage introduction.  Figures 3 and 4 plot the basic data we use to look at these.  The 
change in log total employment is plotted against the initial proportion low-paid in Figure 3a 
and against the initial wage-gap in 3b.  Figures 4a and 4b do the same but with the change in 
log total hours on the left-hand axis.  Eyeballing these scatterplots does not reveal any distinct 
pattern, despite the very clear wage evidence presented earlier. 
In the first instance we estimate reduced form employment change equations of the 
form: 
 
 DlnNit  = a3 + b3 MINi,t -1 + d3Xi,t -1 + zit    (3) 
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Various estimates of equation (3) are given in columns (1) through (6) of Table 6, for 
changes in total employment in the upper panel and for changes in total hours in the lower 
panel of the Table.  In the final two columns of the Table we also present structural estimates 
of labour demand equations from a simple structural model of the following form (equation 
(1) is reproduced from above): 
 
 DlnNit  = a4 + b4 DlnWit  + d4Xi,t-1 + wit    (4) 
DlnWit  = a1+ b1MINi,t -1 + d1Xi,t -1 + e it    (1) 
 
We are able to estimate b4, the wage elasticity of labour demand, by using MIN i,t -1 as an 
instrumental variable for the wage change (equation (1) can thus be thought of as the first 
stage regression in the IV procedure).  It is also straightforward to see how this relates to the 
reduced form models (1) and (3) where the labour demand elasticity b4 is given by b3/b1. 
 Turning to the results in the Table, columns (1) and (4) report the coefficient on the 
initial low pay proportion and the initial wage gap respectively in a regression where the 
dependent variable is the change in log employment or log hours and there are no other 
controls.  In these basic models the estimated impact of the minimum wage is negative, 
though not significantly different from zero.  However the addition of controls and restriction 
of the sample to those with relatively complete information on worker characteristics 
(columns (2) and (3) for the headcount, columns (5) and (6) for the wage gap) makes the 
coefficients both larger in absolute terms and more significant.  In these specifications we are 
able to pin down a significant negative effect on employment growth.   
The Table also reports implicit elasticities calculated on the basis of a minimum wage 
increase of 40p (the adult rate going from £3.60 to £4.00).  These ask the question:  what 
would the additional effect on employment have been if the minimum wage had been 
introduced at a higher level? In the models with controls these elasticities are in the range of 
–.15 to –.40.  These are reasonably sizable in the context of the minimum wage literature, 
though are not so big given the very large impact of minimum wage introduction on the 
wages and wage distribution of care home workers.   
The other, related, way to look at the employment response to wage  changes is to 
directly compute the elasticity of employment with respect to the wage, using the initial wage 
gap variable as an instrument for the change in average wages.  Structural estimates of 
employment change equations are reported in columns (7) and (8).  They reveal a well 
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determined negative wage effect that is moderate in size15, ranging from about -.35 to -.55, 
depending on the specification.   
While the employment effects are clearly not as strong as the wage effects considered, 
they do suggests that employers cut employment and hours in response to the minimum 
wage.  One might wonder how this is possible in this sector as these firms are regulated and 
there are minimum standards of care for the residents that are mandated.  However, 
inspection of these homes is far from perfect and the sector is notorious for examples of 
homeowners providing inadequate standards of care (for example, they have been the subject 
of several TV documentaries).  It seems plausible that managers face a trade-off between the 
fraction of the time they are in breach of care guidelines (which is determined by 
employment) and the probability of being fined when inspected in that situation.  In addition, 
owner-managers often work considerable hours in the homes themselves and may have the 
ability to substitute their labour for that of paid help. 
 
Home Closures and Openings 
 
Thus far we have restricted attention to the balanced panel of continuing homes.  However, 
the sector does have high turnover of workers and businesses.  We have therefore also looked 
at whether home closure and opening rates are connected to the incidence of low-wage 
workers in the period before minimum wage introduction.  We present two sets of analysis on 
this issue.  The first looks at home closure and initial low pay incidence using the home level 
data.  The second compares county- level closure and entry rates to the low pay structure of 
the area before the minimum wage came in.16 
Table 7 contains the home-level closure equations.  Four specifications are reported, 
using the two minimum wage variables, and either including or excluding the control 
variables.  Our analysis is necessarily short run (due to the dating of our home-level data) and 
it is clear that effects may differ if one looks at a longer period, but for the analysis we 
undertake there is a clear pattern.  In none of the specifications is there any evidence that the 
homes with more low-wage workers shut down because of the imposition of the minimum 
wage.  All coefficients are estimated to be positive, as one would expect if one hypothesised 
                                                                 
15  See Hamermesh (1993) for a very detailed consideration of the large body of work that estimates labour 
demand elasticities. 
16 Counties are a lower level of area aggregation than the standard UK regions.  We look at entry and closure in 
55 counties. 
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that the rising wage costs ensuing from the minimum wage would cause closure, but they are 
all statistically insignificant (and with small marginal effects). 
The second analysis, now at county- level, is considered in Table 8.  Here we report 
the same kinds of specifications as in Table 7 for county-level closure rates in the upper panel 
of the Table and for county- level entry rates in the lower panel.  Again, none of the 
associations is significant in statistical terms.  It seems that differential entry and exit related 
to wage levels are unlikely to have contributed to reducing employment in the care homes 
sector over the minimum wage introduction period. 
 
Other Outcomes and the Minimum Wage 
 
This section briefly investigates the impact of the minimum wage on other outcomes.  It is 
possible that they may have ‘passed on’ increased wage costs from the minimum wage 
introduction through higher prices though the extent to which this is possible may be limited 
by the price regulation in place.  Second, there may have had to be re-organizations that could 
raise productivity (e.g. quality of care improvements, or increases in care worker 
productivity, or simply making people work harder for their higher wages). 
We consider these possibilities in Table 9.  The upper panel reports price change 
equations and the lower two panels consider two productivity measures, using the same kind 
of models as for wages and employment.  The first productivity measure used is changes in 
residents per worker hour, the second comes from managers’ responses to a question about 
whether they think worker effort went up, stayed the same, or fell in the period around 
minimum wage introduction. 
Perhaps not surprisingly given the nature of price regulation in the care homes sector 
we find no evidence that prices rose by more in the initial low wage firms.  All the estimated 
coefficients in the upper panel are small and none of the coefficients approach anything near 
statistical significance (all have t-ratios < 1).  As such there seems to be no evidence that 
minimum wage increases might have been passed on through higher prices in this sector. 
There is also not much evidence in line with the re-organization/productivity 
improvement idea considered in the lower panels of Table 9.  While the estimated 
coefficients on the minimum wage variables in both the change in residents per worker hour 
and subjective effort change equations are all estimated to be positive, none are significantly 
different from zero when the control variables are included.   
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6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have presented empirical work on the wage and employment consequences 
of the recent introduction of the UK national minimum wage for a specific sector of the UK 
labour market.  As we argued in the introduction to the paper we think examination of the 
economic effects of this minimum wage introduction provides a good testing ground for 
looking at minimum wage effects and provides an ideal opportunity for presenting some fresh 
evidence on the debate about what minimum wages do.  We implement our empirical study 
by focusing on workers in the care homes industry, a low wage sector that was highly 
vulnerable to minimum wage introduction.  In the absence of suitable data from existing 
sources we chose to examine the minimum wage impact by carrying out our own survey 
before and after the minimum wage was introduced.   
From our analysis of these data we find there to have been a very important wage 
compression effect on the bottom half of the wage distribution in this low wage sector.  
Before its introduction around 1 in 3 care home workers were paid less than the minimum 
wage.  In April 1999 we see a spike in the wage distribution of around 30 percent at exactly 
the minimum wage (and little evidence of non-compliance).  This resulted in wage growth 
being considerably higher in the period surrounding minimum wage workers in homes who 
had more low-paid workers before the minimum came in.  This seems to establish that the 
minimum wage had considerable ‘bite’ on wages and this substantially altered the structure 
of wages of this sector. 
Turning to the employment consequences, we are able to find some evidence of 
employment and hours reductions occurring in homes after minimum wage introduction.  We 
can uncover no evidence that homes had to close down in response to the minimum wage.  
This seems to be in line with the aggregate behaviour of the labour market for care assistants, 
where the fast employment increases of the pre-minimum wage period slowed down in 1999 
and 2000.   
Of course, one should be very careful to note that the sector we have examined is 
particularly vulnerable to the minimum wage as it has very many low-paid workers.  It is also 
rather special in that its product market struc ture means homes are constrained in their ability 
to pass higher wage costs on into higher prices.  Given this, and the fact that studies of the 
impact of minimum wage introduction on the overall UK labour market uncover little 
evidence of job loss (Stewart, 2001), one should remain cautious in drawing conclusions 
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from this study about the impact of the introduction of the National Minimum Wage on the 
UK as a whole. 
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Table 1:  Survey Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 All Firms  Balanced Panel Balanced Panel 
(Excludi ng firms with a 
lot of missing worker 
information) 
 Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Number of Homes 1866 2142 641 641 615 615 
Number of Workers 17.2 
(12.2) 
17.2 
(13.0) 
16.4 
(9.7) 
16.7 
(11.9) 
16.5 
(9.7) 
16.8 
(11.9) 
Hourly Wage 
(None imputed) 
4.03 
(0.85) 
4.27 
(0.80) 
4.00 
(0.80) 
4.24 
(0.72) 
3.98 
(0.74) 
4.23 
(0.71) 
Hourly Wage 
(With imputed) 
4.01 
(0.82) 
4.26 
(0.75) 
3.98 
(0.75) 
4.23 
(0.71) 
3.98 
(0.74) 
4.22 
(0.70) 
Weekly Hours  
(None imputed) 
25.6 
(6.5) 
25.2 
(6.1) 
24.9 
(6.3) 
25.0 
(5.8) 
24.7 
(5.9) 
24.8 
(5.7) 
Weekly Hours  
(With imputed) 
25.8 
(6.5) 
25.4 
(6.0) 
25.2 
(6.2) 
25.2 
(5.8) 
24.9 
(5.9) 
25.0 
(5.6) 
Weekly Earnings 
(None imputed) 
103.85 
(38.92) 
108.31 
(37.65 
100.41 
(37.84) 
106.47 
(34.33) 
99.00 
(33.79) 
105.59 
(33.97) 
Weekly Earnings 
(With imputed) 
104.14 
(37.11) 
108.76 
(35.96) 
100.61 
(34.55) 
107.11 
(33.86) 
99.70 
(33.61) 
106.23 
(33.65) 
Proportion of 
workers with missing 
information 
0.10 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Proportion Female 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Average Age 40.1 
(6.6) 
40.7 
(6.9) 
40.3 
(6.3) 
40.5 
(6.5) 
40.3 
(6.2) 
40.5 
(6.5) 
Proportion Care 
Assistants  
0.63 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.64 
Proportion With 
Nursing 
Qualification 
0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Number of Beds 20.7 
(36.6) 
19.7 
(16.3) 
18.5 
(18.5) 
19.0 
(19.8) 
18.6 
(18.8) 
19.1 
(20.2) 
Number of Residents 18.5 
(35.7) 
17.8 
(15.0) 
16.5 
(17.7) 
17.0 
(18.8) 
16.6 
(18.0) 
17.1 
(19.1) 
Occupancy Rate 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 
Average Weekly 
Price per Bed (£) 
252.4 
(86.1) 
258.2 
(92.3) 
250.1 
(78.3) 
257.4 
(79.3) 
249.6 
(78.3) 
256.9 
(78.9) 
Proportion 
DSS/Local Authority 
0.55 0.58 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.57 
 
 
Notes: 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  Pre-Minimum observations refer to responses received before April 1999 
and Post-Minimum to responses received after March 1999.  Care Assistants include senior, day and junior 
carers but exclude night carers and sleep-ins.  The final two columns exclude homes where less than half of the 
workers have missing hours or wage information. 
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Table 2:  The “Bite” of the Minimum Wage Introduction  
 
 
 All Firms  Balanced Panel Balanced Panel 
(Excluding firms with a lot 
of missing worker 
information) 
 Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
Pre-
Minimum 
Post-
Minimum 
% Paid Less 
Than 
Minimum 
Wage 
32.3 1.0 31.2 0.8 31.6 0.7 
% Paid Less 
Than Adult 
Minimum 
Wage 
38.2 4.2 37.7 4.3 38.2 4.3 
Wage Gap 0.039 0.002 0.041 0.003 0.039 0.002 
Adult Wage 
Gap 
0.047 0.006 0.049 0.007 0.047 0.007 
% Paid 
Exactly 
Minimum 
Wage  
8.7 27.7 9.3 28.4 9.5 28.7 
% Paid 
Exactly Adult 
Minimum 
Wage 
8.6 30.0 9.0 30.6 9.3 31.0 
Number of 
Homes 
1866 2142 641 641 615 615 
 
 
Notes: 
Pre-Minimum observations refer to responses received before April 1999 and Post-Minimum to responses 
received after March 1999.  The final two columns exclude homes where less than half of the workers have 
missing hours or wage information. 
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Table 3:  Changes in Log Wages and Initial Period Wage Measures in the Period 
Surrounding Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
 
Change in Log Average Hourly Wage 
 Time Period Initial Low 
Pay 
Proportion 
Initial 
Wage 
Gap 
Initial 
Log 
Wage 
Controls  R2 Number 
of Homes 
(1) 1998/99 .145 
(.012) 
  No .19 641 
(2) 1998/99 .149 
(.021) 
  Yes .30 598 
(3) 1998/99  
 
.800 
(.070) 
 No .36 641 
(4) 1998/99  
 
.815 
(.086) 
 Yes .45 598 
Change in Log Average Weekly Wage 
 Time Period Initial Low 
Pay 
Proportion 
Initial 
Wage 
Gap 
Initial 
Log 
Wage 
Controls  R2 Number 
of Homes 
(1) 1998/99 .136 
(.025) 
  No .04 641 
(2) 1998/99 .141 
(.035) 
  Yes .19 598 
(3) 1998/99  
 
.664 
(.118) 
 No .06 641 
(4) 1998/99  
 
.693 
(.159) 
 Yes .21 598 
 
 
Notes: 
Sample is balanced panel of homes.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Control variable are the initial proportion 
female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants and average age (all workers), 
occupancy rate, proportion of local authority/dss residents, county and response month dummies. 
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Table 4:  Changes in Log Wages and Initial Period Wage Measures in the Period 
Surrounding Minimum Wage Introduction Compared to an Earlier Period 
(When no Minimum Wage Was in Place) 
 
 
Change in Log Average Hourly Wage 
  1998/99: Period 
Surrounding 
Minimum Wage 
Introduction 
1992/93: Earlier Time 
Period Where no 
Minimum Wage was 
in Place 
Gap (standard error) 
(1) Initial period log 
wage 
-.360 (.040) -.174 (.057) -.186 (.070) 
(2) 
Initial period low 
pay proportion 
(counterfactual in 
1992/93) 
.147 (.013) .019 (.013) .126 (.026) 
(3) 
Initial period wage 
gap (counterfactual 
in 1992/93) 
.800 (.070) .225 (.102) .575 (.124) 
 
 
Notes: 
Based on 641 homes in 1998/99 and 231 homes in 1992/93.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5:  Changes in Log Employment and Hours  
and Initial Period Wage Measures in the Period Surrounding Minimum Wage 
Introduction Compared to an Earlier Period (When no Minimum Wage was in Place) 
 
 
 Change in Log Number Employed 
 
 1998/99: Period 
Surrounding 
Minimum Wage 
Introduction 
1992/93: Earlier Time 
Period Where no 
Minimum Wage was 
in Place 
Gap (standard error) 
(1) Initial period log 
wage 
.108 (.082) -.190 (.147) .299 (.168) 
(2) 
Initial period low 
pay proportion 
(counterfactual in 
1992/93) 
-.059 (.042) -.022 (.044) -.037 (.061) 
(3) 
Initial period wage 
gap (counterfactual 
in 1992/93) 
-.173 (.108) .053 (.137) -.226 (.174) 
 Change in Log Total Hours 
 
 1998/99: Period 
Surrounding 
Minimum Wage 
Introduction 
1992/93: Earlier Time 
Period Where no 
Minimum Wage was 
in Place 
Gap (standard error) 
(1) Initial period log 
wage 
.153 (.093) -.220 (.165) .375 (.189) 
(2) 
Initial period low 
pay proportion 
(counterfactual in 
1992/93) 
-.069 (.046) .028 (.053) -.097 (.069) 
(3) 
Initial period wage 
gap (counterfactual 
in 1992/93) 
-.313 (.135) .365 (.180) -.678 (.224) 
 
 
Notes: 
Based on 641 homes in 1998/99 and 231 homes in 1992/93.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6:  Changes in Log Employment and Hours  
and Initial Period Minimum Wage Measures in the  
Period Surrounding Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
 
 Change in Log Number Employed 
 Reduced Form Models  Structural Models  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Clean 
panel 
(4) (5) (6) 
Clean 
panel 
(7) 
IV 
estimates 
(8) 
Clean 
panel, IV 
estimates 
Initial Proportion Paid 
Less Than Minimum 
Wage 
-.059 
(.042) 
-.136 
(.056) 
-.165 
(.057) 
     
Initial Wage Gap    -.173 
(.108) 
-.281 
(.141) 
-.552 
(.259) 
  
Change in Log Hourly 
Wage 
      -.345 
(.159) 
-.561 
(.317) 
Demographic Variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics 
Variables 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Response Month 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Average Elasticity:  
(4.00-3.60) 
-.14 -.31 -.38 -.08 -.14 -.27   
Observations 641 598 575 641 598 575 598 575 
R-squared .003 .155 .152 .001 .149 .143   
 Change in Log Total Hours 
 Reduced Form Models  Structural Models  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Clean 
panel 
(4) (5) (6) 
Clean 
panel 
(7) 
IV 
estimates 
(8) 
Clean 
panel, IV 
estimates 
Initial Proportion Paid 
Less Than Minimum 
Wage 
-.069 
(.046) 
-.144 
(.066) 
-.170 
(.066) 
     
Initial Wage Gap    -.310 
(.135) 
-.402 
(.145) 
-.509 
(.311) 
  
Change in Log Hourly 
Wage 
      -.494 
(.289) 
-.518 
(.353) 
Demographic Variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics 
Variables 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Response Month 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Average Elasticity  
(4.00-3.60) 
-.16 -.33 -.39 -.15 -.20 -.25   
Observations 641 598 575 641 598 575 598 575 
R-squared .003 .135 .148 .004 .132 .139   
 
 
Notes: 
Sample is balanced panel of homes.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Control variable are the initial proportion 
female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants and average age (all workers), 
occupancy rate, proportion of local authority/dss residents, county and response month dummies. 
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Table 7:  Home Closures and the Minimum Wage 
 
 
 Home Closures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than Minimum 
Wage 
0.017 
(0.178) 
[0.004] 
0.044 
(0.222) 
[0.009]   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
1.381 
(0.889) 
[ 0.294] 
1.473 
(0.994) 
[0.292] 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
Response Month Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Log-Likelihood -266.05 -237.36 -264.86 -236.29 
Number of Homes 682 647 682 647 
Number of Closures 90 85 90 85 
 
 
Notes: 
Probit coefficient estimates, standard errors in parentheses.  Marginal effects in square brackets.  Control variable are the 
initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants and average age (all workers), 
occupancy rate, proportion of local authority/dss residents, county and response month dummies. 
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Table 8:  County-level Closures and Entrants and the Minimum Wage 
 
 
 County Closure Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than 
Minimum Wage 
0.074 
(0.242) 
[0.007] 
0.285 
(0.268) 
[0.025]   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
0.458 
(1.347) 
[0.040] 
1.490 
(1.430) 
[0.132] 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 
Number of Counties 55 55 55 55 
 County Entry Rate 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than 
Minimum Wage 
-0.418 
(0.430) 
[-0.022] 
-0.265 
(0.463) 
[0.014]   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
-1.080 
(2.409) 
[-0.056] 
0.254 
(2.481) 
[0.013] 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.21 
Number of Counties 55 55 55 55 
 
 
Notes: 
Sample is county level panel data compiled from the unbalanced panel of care homes.  Closure rate refers to 
proportion of estimated home closures of all homes by county; dependent variable is the logistic transformation 
log [p(1-p)].  Entrant rate refers to proportion of estimated new homes of all homes by county; dependent 
variable is log ((p+1/(2n))/(1-p+1/(2n))), with the correction included due to zero entry rates in 2 counties.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  Marginal effects in square brackets.  Control variable are the initial proportion 
female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants and average age (all workers), 
occupancy rate, proportion of local authority/dss residents, county and response month dummies. 
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Table 9:  Prices, Productivity and the Minimum Wage 
 
 
 Change in Log Average Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than Minimum Wage -0.001 
(0.024) 
-0.013 
(0.027)   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
0.116 
(0.145) 
0.048 
(0.155) 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
Response Month Dummies  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11 
Number of Homes 572 501 572 501 
 Change in Log Residents Per Worker Hour 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than Minimum Wage 0.103 
(0.044) 
0.068 
(0.047)   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
0.334 
(0.275) 
0.111 
(0.273) 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
Response Month Dummies  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.20 
Number of Homes 586 514 586 514 
 Subjective Responses on Change in Worker Effort 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Initial Proportion Paid Less Than Minimum Wage 0.063 
(0.183) 
0.100 
(0.201)   
Initial Wage Gap 
  
0.530 
(1.085) 
0.922 
(1.166) 
Demographic Variables  Yes  Yes 
Home Characteristics Variables  Yes  Yes 
Response Month Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Log-Likelihood -245.24 -210.91 -245.18 -210.72 
Number of Homes 561 486 561 486 
 
 
Notes: 
As for Table 6.  Effort variable coded as an ordered response based on answers to the question “Has the 
minimum wage had an impact on work effort in your business?  No/Yes – Decrease/Yes-Increase”.  It is ordered 
from 0 (decrease), 1 (no change), to 2 (increase).  Ordered probit coefficients (and associated standard errors) 
reported for this variable. 
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Figure 1 
Numbers of Private Sector Care Assistants, 1994-2001 
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Source:  Labour Force Survey.  Each point corresponds to the mid -month of each LFS quarter.  Vertical line 
corresponds to minimum wage introduction in April 1999. 
 30 
Figure 2a 
The Relationship Between Wage Growth and Initial Wages:  1998/99 
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Figure 2b 
The Relationship Between Wage Growth and Initial Wages:  1992/93 
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Figure 3a 
The Relationship Between the Change in Log Total Employment and Initial Proportion 
Low-Paid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b 
The Relationship Between the Change in Log Total Employment and Initial Wage Gap 
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Figure 4a 
The Relationship Between the Change in Log Total Hours and Initial Proportion 
Low-Paid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4b 
The Relationship Between the Change in Log Total Hours and Initial Wage Gap 
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Appendix:  Pre Introduction Survey 
 
MINIMUM WAGE SURVEY 
 
The National Minimum Wage 
 
1.  Before receiving this questionnaire were you aware that a National Minimum Wage is to be 
introduced next year? 
 
yes   ______  no   ______ 
 
2.  What do you think the minimum hourly pay rate for adults will be?                                 ______ 
 
3.  Do you think this is about right, too high or too low? 
 
About right   ______              Too high   _________  Too low _________ 
 
4.  What impact do you think the national minimum wage will have on your business? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Your Business 
1.  What type of business do you run? 
 
Private _____                          Voluntary ______  Local authority ______ 
 
2.  Is your business part of a larger organisation? 
 
yes   ______  no   ______ 
 
3.  How many registered beds do you have?                    ______ 
 
4.  How many residents do you have at the moment?             ______ 
 
5.  How many of your residents at the moment require specialist care?    ______ 
 
6.  What is the typical weekly charge for a resident in your home?    ______ 
 
7.  How many of the current residents are paid for by the DSS  
    and/or Local Authority Social Services?    ______ 
 
Your Workers  
1.  How many employees do you have at the moment (full and part-time)?         ______ 
2.  In the past three months how many workers have you recruited in total?         ______ 
3.  In the past three months how many workers have left in total?      ______ 
4.  Approximately what percentage of your total costs are labour costs?       ______ 
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5. For all your current employees could you please provide the following information:  job title, 
sex, age, length of service, possession of a nursing qualification, hours worked and basic hourly 
wages (excluding higher nightwork rates etc). 
 
 
 
 
 Job title 
 
Sex 
(M/F) 
 
Age 
 
Length of 
Service 
 
Nursing 
Qualific-
ation 
 
Weekly 
Hours 
 
Basic 
hourly 
wage 
 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
If you have more than 20 employees please continue overleaf. 
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 Job title 
 
Sex 
(M/F) 
 
Age 
 
Length of 
Service 
 
Nursing 
Qualific-
ation 
 
Weekly 
Hours 
 
Basic 
hourly 
wage 
 
21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix:  Post Introduction Survey 
 
MINIMUM WAGE SURVEY 
 
The National Minimum Wage 
 
1. The National Minimum Wage was introduced in April 1999.  Do you think that the level was: 
 
About right   ______      Too high   _________ Too low _________ 
 
2.  What impact do you think the National Minimum Wage has had on your business? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Has the minimum wage had an impact on any of the following in your business? 
 
Employment Yes  ____ No  ____ If Yes:  Decrease _____     Increase _____ 
 
Hours   Yes  ____ No  ____ If Yes:  Decrease _____     Increase _____ 
 
Output  Yes  ____ No  ____ If Yes:  Decrease _____     Increase _____ 
 
Prices  Yes  ____ No  ____ If Yes:  Decrease _____     Increase _____ 
 
Work Effort Yes  ____ No  ____ If Yes:  Decrease _____     Increase _____ 
 
 
Your Business 
1.  What type of business do you run? 
 
Private ______                        Voluntary ______  Local authority ______ 
 
2.  Is your business part of a larger organisation? 
 
Yes   ______  No   ______ 
 
3.  How many registered beds do you have?       ______ 
 
4.  How many residents do you have at the moment?      ______ 
 
5.  How many of your residents at the moment require specialist care?    ______ 
 
6.  What is the typical weekly charge for a resident in your home?   ______ 
 
7.  How many of the current residents are paid for by the DSS  
    and/or Local Authority Social Services?    ______ 
 
Your Workers  
1.  How many employees do you have at the moment (full and part-time)?         ______ 
2.  In the past three months how many workers have you recruited in total?        ______ 
3.  In the past three months how many workers have left in total?        _____ 
4.  Approximately what percentage of your total costs are labour costs?       ______ 
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5. For all your current employees could you please provide the following information:  job title, 
sex, age, length of service, possession of a nursing qualification, hours worked and basic hourly 
wages (excluding higher nightwork rates etc). 
 
 
 
 
 Job title 
 
Sex 
(M/F) 
 
Age 
 
Length of 
Service 
 
Nursing 
Qualific-
ation 
 
Weekly 
Hours 
 
Basic 
hourly 
wage 
 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
If you have more than 20 employees please continue overleaf. 
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 Job title 
 
Sex 
(M/F) 
 
Age 
 
Length of 
Service 
 
Nursing 
Qualific-
ation 
 
Weekly 
Hours 
 
Basic 
hourly 
wage 
 
21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Thank you very much for your cooperation
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